tv Politics and Public Policy Today CSPAN October 16, 2015 2:00pm-4:01pm EDT
stress is the informal processes we have put in place. we have scheduled routine meetings with my ciso, richard hale who you will hear from today in a closed meeting. we are sharing that data. we are moving forward to be able to give them some of our data quicker. mike's work has been superb in being able to lower the classification levels of data so we can share that much quicker with industry and accept theirs in a similar fashion. all of those things are adding to our -- all of us, industry and the government's collection of data and what i'll call operational intelligence that we can use to better security. >> this is an issue where we collaborate very closely. u.s. cyber command, department of homeland security, garden reserve, the about how can we make sure we are most effective and efficient within the broader
authority construct. can we use that existing framework to the maximum extent possible as opposed to something new and complex in the cyber arena. >> thank you for pitching in. a very grateful navy dad with three sons in the army guard. but i'm very grateful for your service. you stated "the iranian actors have been was implicated in a 2012-2013 attacks against u.s. financial institutions and in february 2014, last year, cyber attack on the los angeles sands casino.
what economic sanctions or legal actions resulted from this activity? are they being maintained? >> sir, i'm going to have to take that for the record. i don't know exactly what sanctions the ddos attack that you refer to against the financial services was attributed to iran, as well as the sands casino, as you said. i'm going to have to get back to you and say exactly what we did as a result of those two attacks. mike might know. >> no specific sanctions tied to each of those individual events. clearly a broader exception of what's acceptable and not accept isable. it has decreased. in part because of the broader, very public discussion where we were acknowledging the activity and we were partnering. >> thank you, mr. chairman. if any of you can answer this question, i'm curious, though, are we still exploring what the
outer limits of what constitutes the equivalent of a physical attack against the u.s. when we're looking at cyber attacks. do we know what would be an equivalent cyber attack that would warrant the kind of -- and size of response we might do if it was a physical kinetic attack against the u.s.? are we exploring that still? >> we have defined a significant consequence, it has to cause serious adverse u.s. foreign policy implications or consequences or serious economic impact. that's a broad statement. each of them have to be addressed as an individual act. that's why there is no
established red line on what we would say this constitutes a physical attack. the question we are often asked is is when does a cyber attack trigger an act of war. each of those would be discussed in turn depending on the type of attack and what its consequences were. as of this point, we have not assessed any particular attack has constituted an act of war. >> can you -- admiral, you address a little bit. be more specific about the title 10 versus title 32 responsibilities and working with the national guard. or even going beyond that, working with either national; state or local law enforcement. what specific criteria do you use to make that distinction? >> for me, among the things i look at are scope of the activity we're dealing with, capacity that exists in title 10 arena versus in the title 32. there's specific knowledge or unique insights that a
particular guard structure might have that are tailored to this specific issue. it's a case by case basis. we need one integrated workforce between the active and the reserve using the same basic scheme of maneuver so we can use these capabilities interchangeably. it gives us a broad range of options in terms of how we employ the capability. >> and then are you making that largely permanent? at some point in the future you moved on to something else and someone comes in behind you. is this still evolving how you are trying to establish these relationships as they apply to cyber, or are these going to be
largely permanent? will we be changing the story? >> i think they will be largely permanent. i feel pretty good that we have done the foundational work, broadly. i always remind people. remember, no plan ever survives contact. in the broad framework, we are likely to see things we haven't anticipated. we have to be flexible and be willing to change given the specifics of whatever it is is we're dealing with. but for the way we are partnered, it hasn't been adversarial at all. it has been a great team. >> i would like to jump in on that sir. i would like to give a shoutout. we have been dealing with this on how to build up cyber capacity in the guard and reserve. we are building right now towards about 2,000 guard and reserves that are associated with this. and what we are doing right now is trying to work out the policy
on what our folks can do in terms of coordination, training, advising and assist under title 32 and title 10 authorities. that is actually policy working well. we are working well with the governors. we believe this is going to be a great new story for the nation. >> and my last few moments here i have a question. we talked about defense of networks. we talked about resilience, denial, and the whole deterrence issue. this issue of hybrid warfare. i'm curious about what steps you're taking to in corporate in a u.s. response or even nato's response in the role cyber com plays in this and incorporating a response of capability within this hybrid warfare concept. >> so it's a concept. we're partnering as the supreme allied commander.
i also highlight the work that special operations command are doing in this regard. i was just down in tampa about 10 days ago. this was part of our broad discussion how to integrate the full range of capabilities in the department as we are trying to respond to an evolving world around us. i think we are starting to have some good conversations and a good broad way ahead. i think the framework, not as far advanced. it is an area we have talked about we have got to work on. >> my time is up. thank you very much. >> now proceed to the congressman from colorado. >> i appreciate your comments to earlier questions that were directed from congresswoman susan davis. but i would like to follow up and build on that.
this concerns recruiting and retaining top talent. what are your efforts to -- and this is for you, admiral rogers in particular. what are your efforts to develop a career cyber career track for those in the military? >> services generate the capacity i employ as joint commander. in the cyber arena, what has been a big strength is how we are going to develop this, what are the standards, what are the skills. that's what i did in fact, in my last job. i'm very comfortable with how each service has tried to create a career path. it enables us to extend over an entire career both this capability as well as generate the insights in the workforce. that is a big change the last 5 to 10 years. it is not an area i look at how and say, wow, i have heavy concerns there.
they have a good broad vision. i have yet to run in, knock on wood, i have not yet run into a scenario where we didn't have the level of knowledge. the challenge is i might have had a handful of people with the right level of knowledge. but we had people with the knowledge. i have to build that capacity out more. so we have more, if you will. >> that's really encouraging. so thank you. secretary work, the department has really floated new civilian and military personnel reforms, compensation, retirement, equity. how will some of these reforms affect the cyber workforce? >> i was going to try to jump in here. this is a huge priority for secretary carter. he came into the departments believing that over time we have created these services for our government. he wants to really, as he talks, burrow tunnels through the
barriers or widen the aperture. he uses cyber as an example of new ways in which we might bring people in and allow them to serve for a while, then go back out into the civilian workforce and then come back in. so he has challenged us. and the undersecretary brad carson on this force of the future to say how can we make sure that in areas like cyberspace, electronic warfare, we have more permeability. they are in the process of going through a deliberative, which ideas are good. but we are right with the intent of your question to improve the ways in which people can come in and out of our government service. this is an exciting mission for many people.
maybe they don't want to make a 30-year career. so we have to improve the way to do that. >> thank you. do you have anything to a add to what has already been said? >> -- same comments. you have heard we are moving forward for us to put for the first time, civilians out in industry. those pilots are moving very well. as we use those to inform practiced and his work, you will see great things coming out of this. >> well, i think for your answers. thank you for the great work you're doing. i yield back. >> thank you. we proceed to congresswoman nicky sangas. >> thank you. it has been a topic of great importance. as you said, so much of this is is being able to attract the
people who have the skill set to sinking this through. it is not easy stuff, that's for sure, at all. and i gather from the testimony i have heard there is a fair a amount of comfort level with what dod and the military services have been able to do to put in place appropriate means of training, hiring, and then compensating, even though you have said you may have to come back to us in the future. but you also commented this is an interagency effort. you are working with the department of homeland security, law enforcement, the fbi, the intelligence community. how much sharing across those borders is taking place in terms of the skill set that you need in each of those aspects of this effort? and how comfortable are you with the ways in which you are working together and how they are responding to the challenges they face in terms of personnel?
>> i would argue very well. for example, this is when i sat down with the director of the fbi. this is a conversation i had with the leadership at homeland security. i have quite frankly had it with the private sector. we are both competing for the same pool. what works for you, what we might be able to do differently, as you said, can we partner. i will make one slight twist, because this is a point i wanted to make today, on the outside the single greatest thing i have experienced with my workforce in 18 has been even a hint of a shutdown. in the last week, i have had more agitation arguing this would be the second time in two years. and we're even having this discussion, hey, even if we don't shut down, the workforce is very open with us about i'm not so sure i want to be part of an organization where there is this lack of control.
and i can't count on stability. that really concerns me. because i can't overcome that. >> secretary wot, do you have any -- >> well, this is a very competitive field, as the admiral said. we are building up a total of 133 cyber teams in the cyber mission force. some are focused on protection of the networks. they are cyber protection teams. others are the national mission teams. and our combatant commanders. we want to build to a total of 133 of these teams. it will be 6,200 active military duty, civilians and in some special instances, contractors. and we won't get there until 2018. so we are in the process of building these. this is a very competitive space. we're on track. we are doing well in our recruit. as admiral rodgers says, any hint of shutdown or sequestration, that will set us back.
we think we have a good mission that people will want to participate in. but we are not where we need to be yet, congresswoman. we still have until 2018 to build up the force to where we just think is the minimum necessary to do our missions. >> you know, i serve on the board of one of the service academies, board of visitors. i know in our discussion it it has been difficult to attract young airmen in this in entrance to the cyber field. they come into the academy with a particular idea in mind where they want to spend their time. so it's not always as simple as we would like to think given the extraordinary challenge. but i have another question as well. you know, the department has shown its commitment to
leveraging cyber innovation. we have heard about that today. i commend secretary carter with making his way out to silicon valley to create presence, a satellite campus to have a way in which to interact more easily with that community. and i just wonder, how will you expand that program and look to other programs where you have a deep bench of cyber activists, cyber experts. >> if you are referring to the defense innovation experimental. it is is an experimental unit. we want to see how we can interact with the private sector in the best way. for example, one of our ideas was to bring people back to the pentagon and show them what we're doing. they said, no, we want to go to the field and see what your airmen, soldiers, marines and sailors, what do they do? we want to help them. so once we do the lessons learned there, it would become a permanent unit. we would go to other innovation centers, perhaps boston.
mr. halgorsen has been helping us as well. >> we took a team to silicon valley in september. we are doing a similar thing in boston, in new york. and not just that. we have hosted a group down from boston and new york. some of the more mature cyber companies but also a group of some of the innovative companies. i think what we are trying to do with dix, is is take what it stands for, not the geographic location, and make sure -- the secretary is is very clear with us, hey, it's more about the concept of innovation. reach to wherever that it. so you will see us spend more attention in the northeast and frankly in the southwest sector. >> there is really no substitute for physical presence and physical interaction that can take place. thank you.
my time is up. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> the army is establishing a cyber campus in the aviation and missile research development and engineering center, also known as mrdec. it provides world class cyber security support to aviation and missile systems by outing cutting edge of cyber security solutions to challenges associated with emerging and legacy technologies. the mrdec cyber campus coordinates cyber activities with industry, academia, and government partners. although it is is uniquely positioned to integrate the department of homeland security, the department of justice, space and missile defense command, and the industrial base. additionally, it can provide deep expertise and reduce cyber threats posed as it relates to hardware, software, firm wear,
networks, test, modeling, simulations, forensics, industrial control systems, supervisory control, and data acquisition systems. with that as a backdrop, and these are for each of you.d&a ç how does it integrate with the department of defense's overall cyber strategy? >> well, as admiral rodgers said, each services are developing cyber skills under their title 10 responsibilities. this is just one reflection of many, many, many such organizations that are being set up. the air force has units down in is san antonio. so i would ask admiral rodgers to give you more specifics. but each of these are going to have specific skills. in this case the one that you have talked about congressman focusing on the aviation systems of the army and making sure they are not vulnerable to cyber attack.
but they develop other skills too. >> so every service is developing a similar kind of capability, similar kinds of relationships. army chose to harness the capability in red stone, and northern alabama area. the positive thing for me is is we've got a good, strong collaboration across the services as to who is doing what and where. the question increasingly for us over time is as we get more experience, do we need to increase investments where we are seeing strong results than other areas where it hasn't played out as well as we would like. we will generate more insights to that over time. >> mr. halgorsen, would you like to add anything? >> part of what that unit is doing is bringing a solution to the problem. i think they were perfectly in line.
>> is there a consolidated effort to ensure cyber centers, such as redstone, are interconnected with other services and department of defense capabilities to properly acknowledge and not create stove pipes of information or efforts? >> i don't know that we have a formal -- i know there's regular analytic and particular venues where they all get-together. i participate. and my team participate also in some of those. i don't know that there is a formal process, if you will. i try to synchronize that with each of the service components. hey, we have to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. because there's more requirements and money and time. it's all about how do we maximize outputs.
>> mr. work? >> sir, i don't believe there is a formal program right now. we would look at it more in terms of function. right now i can tell you in terms of defense of networks, everything is on the same playing field. we all have the same score cards. we all grade ourselves exactly the same. to your specific question on whether or not we have a formal program, that's i will need to go back and research. it sounds like a good idea. i just don't know exactly how we would implement it yet? >> mr. halgersen? >> it sounds very interesting. >> i yield back. >> we now proceed to congressman of texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary work, you were talking about the three tenets of deterrents. the first two, denial and resilience i understand pretty well.
there have been a number of questions about the third one, which is cost imposition. i'm interested in knowing how we advertise the consequences of cyber attacks to potential adversaries. and to the degree that you can talk about it, how have some of the consequences we have imposed thus far changed their behavior? in other words, how have we done on the third tenent in cost imposition. >> we will respond at a time, place, and manner of our choosing. we have to communicate primarily with state actors. i think admiral rodgers said we're pretty good at stopping 99.5% of the attacks. getting rid of the basic hacker. it is the state adversaries that
pose the biggest challenge. and i would just like to weave in -- i think the chairman mentioned the cyber agreement. that came about from intensive discussions with china saying this behavior is unacceptable. we have to come to grips with it. so there were four specific aspects of what i would consider this a confidence-building measure. the first one is we have to have timely response for information and assistance if we go to china and say, hey, there is an actor inside china conducting these activities. we have agreed to share that information. both the united states and china have agreed that they will not knowingly conduct cyber-related theft of intellectual property for commercial gain. we are making common effort in these norms of state, norms of behavior, which we have never done before. then we agreed to a high-level joint dialogue. people say, whoa, there is no
enforcement mechanism. sit a confidence-building measure. it is the first time that the president of china has said i will commit my government to these things. we believe it is very, very significant and could lead to this. it came about from high-level dialogue where we said we believe your behavior is highly unacceptable. we have options but how do we work this out. in sony, we attributed that, we had sanctions. it may lead to the better norms of behavior between nation states. >> i think that's the hope. what are you actually seeing in terms of changed behaviors? i understand the agreement, which is important. and the statements of intent. what are you seeing in terms of number and severity of intrusions or cyber attacks
following, you know, letting our adversaries know we will choose the place and time of a response is and having responded in some of these cases, what has that done? >> in broad terms, you haven't seen the north koreans attempt another act since november 2014 after our very public attribution and discussion. i would argue at least the denial of service activity we saw the iranians in the 2012-2013 time frame. we have not observed that of late. i would argue for other nation states the impact to the date, i have not seen significant changes. it is early with respect to the prc. trust me, we will be paying great attention to how this plays out over time.
>> i think that's something that i, and perhaps other members of the committee, would be interesting in receiving a briefing on going forward just to look at how behaviors are changing, whether that third tenet of ensuring the adversaries, making sure that is really working. appreciate your answers, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> we now proceed to the congresswoman from indiana. >> thank you. you said earlier russia is a competitor in terms of cyber technology threats that are out there. i'm interested to see what your perspective is. i've been sitting here and watching through the course of this hearing the russian bombers that let loose today in syria with one-hour notice to our generals in baghdad. and striking non-isis targets. and i think this is a reprehensible activity that is happening today.
and i have many questions as to how we ended up here. but i'm curious from you. with this development today of an overaggressive russia, how do we talk about sharing intel and trusting anything that comes from putin and russia. >> do they have to prevail here? when we just literally saw what happened this morning. for many of us who sat on this committee for a long time, saw a red line violated and not upheld in syria. we have seen these gaps with an administration that seems to not have any strategy or contiguous plan. i know you're talking about the broad context. but i don't understand the gap that is going -- that's already been there. but the gap that will continue to emerge today. how do we breach that and how do we say to the american people looking our constituents that we have their back and we are looking out for the security of the united states of america. and we are watching vladimir
putin next to our cohort and friend to help israel, does that have any kind of semblance of trust with putin and russia? >> i would only argue that it fits in a broader issue.zñ this is not a new phenomena with this particular actor. it's why we have been very direct with them. the secretary has had conversations with the russian framework. i have not had specific cyber discussions with him. one of the points i try to make in our internal discussions is i'm watching russians use cyber in an increasingly aggressive way. >> this is alarming. he just talked to the president and said stay out of our airspace. now we get one hour and they attack syria. we are fighting back and forth
over all kinds of things. we just had the pope here. while the americans are distract today over here, he does another major push in syria. the alarm, not only for lawmakers, but for the citizens of our country we are vowing to protect, we have watched him establish himself in syria, in the middle east. >> obviously as outlined by president putin, i believe he is following his national interesting. we are learned by what was happening. we agreed our militaries would talk. >> have we not seen a failure between our president and president putin if we were going to talk because now he is there one hour of notice with all of
our forces over there, allied forces, nato force, the other nations that are fighting as well. wouldn't we not see this as a failure? >> i don't believe it's a failure. i believe it's an aggressive maneuver of russia. >> are you confident that those two leaders have a strategy and that we're holding up our end of the bargain? are you confident that the administration is looking at this as, oh, well, we expected this to happen. i represent three-quarters of a million people that are looking at their tvs and the official zñ responsibilities from the pentagon, we're taken aback by the strikes. we're all taken aback. well, we know they are going to do their thing. we are going to see at what form we can contain them. >> they encroach on ukraine. they have been doing military action. today we are watching a live bombing.
from your perspective and the perspective of the administration, we expected that the american people? i don't expect that. >> the russians made clear they would support the assad regime with air strikes. and we made an agreement to have our militaries talk so there would not be any problem between interactions -- >> you think one hour of notice is legitimate? obviously talks broke down. what is our response now? >> you have me at a disadvantage, congresswoman. i don't know what has handled the last hour. we heard about the attacks this morning. they asked us to avoid the area
where they would be operating. we continue to fly throughout syria. >> are we continuing to talk to our russian counteropponents? >> we have agreed for our militaries to meet. that has not occurred. it is an agreement between the two presidents couple days ago. >> would you agree this is not a crisis? for the first time they have now entered the middle east. for the fitter time we have watching the broadening of putin's powers, who was right here on american soil right next to a mess, a hotbed of war, and right next to our dear ally, israel. have we not watched something elevate into a crisis. russia has just gone from their position, through the ukraine, looking at eastern europe, and has sufficiently landed themselves with a coalition inside syria? >> i do not believe it's a crisis.
i believe it is a disagreement in strategy. that is what we are trying to work out. >> i respect that. i believe it is a crisis. i think we have a president with to foreign policy. we have had red lines talked about and crossed. this played out all by itself. here we are back on tv in front of every single american wondering who in the world is defending our country. with that, i yield back. >> thank you, congresswoman. now to mr. tacaye. >> i would like to rebalance and refocus to cyber strategy, if i may. a lot of my colleagues have asked about deterrents. this is also something i'm concerned about after recent events that have been discussed. with current threats to our cyber network, the need to discuss here today, including creating and maintaining a persistent training environment,
developing of a unified platform, and building the joint information environment to secure the deal in the enterprise. the development of these priorities cannot only serve as a deterrent in their own right but will enable our cyber force mission readiness to be the best in the world. admiral rodgers, who is dod in these priorities? persistent training environment, unified platform, and joint information. >> so persistent training environment is a program we put together. it will take several years to finish. '17 represents the third year of funding for it. we're working through the '17 build internally. again, i sense strong support for this. i haven't come to where i say we have problems way ahead. it seems to be working. i will let terry comment because it has been a particular focus for you.
unified platform, relatively new idea for us. five years practice experience. we believe it needs to create a somewhat separate. we are starting with the '17 build. as we gain more experience, as we do this over time, we have to continually reassess and ask ourselves. some of the assumptions we made, are they proving to be what we thought they were, or do we need to make changes? >> jie, the joint regional security tax are on track. they will be funded in '17 and fully operational by the end of '17. >> okay. thank you. and i wanted to go back to the integration of personnel. i know the secretary mentioned it and i think you, admiral, as well. i want to focus on defining where the role of the national guard fits into the cyber
strategy. i'm a member of the guard in hawaii. and all of us here on this committee have constituents in the guard. can you touch upon some of the points on where the guard can increase their role in the larger cyber mission? >> let me just start by saying our cyber force as we discussed earlier, congressman is about 6,200 active civilians, and in some special cases, contractors. >> that's what you said, secretary. you didn't mention national guard. >> 2,000 national guard and reserves on top of that. some of them will be part of the cyber teams that i talked about. others will be extra capacity that might be able to help the states. the council of governors and we have been working very, very closely together. our policy is working through all the aspects of what we can
do under title 32 and title 10 authorities in support of the states. but the guard and reserves will be absolutely central to the cyber mention forth, about a quarter of the entire force. 6,200 on the active side, and another 2,000 on the reserve and national guard. so they are absolutely central. >> the only other comment i would make, i am the son of a guardsman. as a child i watched him every day, every month, every summer. i played in armories with my father. every service has used a slightly different construct. they are using the guard and the reserve to fill out a part, if you will, of the active requirement for their share of the 6,200. in the case of the army, they have decided that the guard and the reserve represent an opportunity to generate additional capacity over and above the 6,200 people. clearly navy and marine corps.
don't have a different construct for them as i said, the discussions today have been very good. we got way ahead in terms of how to work our way through this, this additional capacity, if you will, that the guard is developing and partnering with the states as to how to view this as one integrated enterprise, as it were. so we are maximizing the department that the states are investing in. >> you spoke earlier about the cyber teams and the number of teams you're building. i understand there may be in fact, opportunities for these teams to be wholly guard. you didn't mention that today. so can you explain. >> i said in the case of the air force, for example, their portion of the share of 133 they in fact, are creating a small number of teams that are wholly guard. >> one more question for the secretary.
how resilient are our military networks to cyber attacks and how do you measure and qualify resilience? >> we are getting better, but we're not where we need to be. that is why secretary carter has said defense of our network is absolutely job number one. now, that will come through a whole lot of different things. as i said in my opening statement. first, get the network as defendable as possible. so the jai and the joint regional security stacks will take 1,000 defendable fire walls to 200. the number of enclaves will be developed. the second is to build up these teams. so that is another big part. and the other one is to have a cyber score card which is telling us exactly how well we are doing. mr. hal very son was the creator of the score card. i would ask him how to be able
to track. >> it is a measure on the score card that we are actively developing. >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> admiral mike rodgers, appreciate to have you. >> i apologize. i didn't hear the question. >> do you use telecommunications equipment manufactured by wow way in your offices? >> absolutely not. and i know of no other -- i don't believe we operate in the pentagon, any systems in the pentagon. >> admiral rodgers? >> no. >> why do you not use it.
>> from us, it's a broader conscious decision as we look at supply chain and potential vulnerabilities. it's a risk we felt unacceptable. >> what about your clear defense contractors? should they be using wowway telecommunications equipment. >> i will have to take that for the record. i know of no defense contractors that are using wowway equipment but i just don't know. admiral? >> this is a departmental issue. the contracts we have, we specify standards that you have to meet. we specify the requirement to notify us. again, we have to take it as a question. i don't know the current language. i don't know if the current language specifies certain vendors. i know we are very specific about making that standard in the nuclear and other areas. we are very explicit. but that is not allowable.
>> i would appreciate whether you can get back with me whether any are compelled to use wow way. >> the next has to do with the enterprise review that recognizes the huey one helicopters are woefully in adequate and ant acquitted. we need new modern helicopters. because after all we are talk building nuclear weapons. based on a meeting i had with the air force and osd a few weeks ago, i'm concerned that the acquisition approach would take four or more years to get the helicopters. it is alarming. what can you tell me about why we are looking at such a long period of time?
>> well, first of all, this is an extremely high priority. we are dealing with it right now in pbr-17. last year the air force plan to replace those helicopters was to take their uh-60as -- excuse me. take them and upgrade to 60ls. they were just too old and tired and it became cost prohibitive. that's why the timing slid. now we will have to buy uh-60ms. or whatever we decide, whether we can do sole source or whether it has to be competition. commander of u.s. strategic command, admiral cecil haney, said we cannot afford to wait for four years.
we are looking at a wide variety of measures to mitigate the problem until we can get the new helicopters built. it is a high priority issue for us in this budget build. and i will be able to give you a little bit more information once we work through all the different options before us. >> well, i just want you to understand i really believe we should see an immediate reprogramming request for the '17 budget. i will close by saying it is about to be sent to the president. i would like to talk with you offline about our new engine to replace the 80 as soon as we get a chance to privately. i will yield back my time and go to ms. spear. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you gentlemen for your service to our country. we are dealing with very, very savvy actors in these area various foreign countries
hacking into us. you seemed somewhat elated by the agreement. yet i have reason to be very skeptical about them complying with what they agreed to comply with. what isn't in the agreement that you would have wished was in the agreement? >> well, i wouldn't characterize my reaction as elation, congresswoman as i believe it is a very good first step. it is the first time that the president of china has committed himself and his country to issue that have been of high concern to our government. >> i understand that. what wasn't in the agreement? i have very limited time so if you could please answer the question. >> there were no enforcement
mechanisms per se. it is the key thing people have pointed out. again, i believe this was a confidence building measure. china will prove they are serious about this or not. then we can take actions as necessary if they prove not to follow through on their commitment. >> the opm hack was devastating. it is clear that china did it. they denied it. it's also very clear they now have very personal information about many persons with top secret status. and the fishing that just went on with the joint chiefs of staff unclassified e-mail worries me a great deal. whether it's russia or china. access to that personal information is such that if they know who your family members are or next door neighbor they can pretend that they are your family member or next door
neighbor, you are more apt to click on that and they can get in. what is requiring greater accountability by those who hold those positions who end up clicking by either punishing them or coming up with some system so we can anticipate that kind of fishing going on and prevent it? >> i would just like to make an overall point and then turn it over to mike and terry. although our adversaries have very sophisticated capabilities, almost every intrusion has occurred because of bad cyber hygiene. they click on a spear fishing attempt. so we are going after that. i would like to say that is the biggest problem we have is getting our cyber hygiene better. >> okay. what kind of -- is there any kind of penalty being imposed on
those who on a careless manner click on to them? >> the simple answer is yes. i won't go into the specifics. actions have been taken for up accountability on that and taken actions for those who have misbehaved in a cyber way. secondly we have increased the training frequently of phishing training and we have taken certain actions on the networks to eliminate the ability to click on links and at a minimum we have a warning on there now that says you must think about this link and in some cases -- and, again, i won't specifically -- you physically can no longer click on links via any of our networks. >> i would say from a network perspective i've implemented nine technical changes where i told users i'll make your life harder if this is what it takes to drive a change in behavior i will make your user life harder to try to preclude this from happening. >> my last question and very briefly. what's keeping you up at night?
>> so, i'd say from my perspective there's three things in cyber that concern me. are we going to see offensive activity taken against u.s. critical infrastructure. are we going to see the focus shift from theft of intellectual to manipulation of the data in our system so we can no longer trust what we see. and the third thing that worries me are we going to see nonstate actors, read terrorist groups, probably at the forefront of my mind start to use the web as an offensive weapon. >> thank you. >> i would add two things, one, we have a large number of system, congresswoman that were built in an era like admiral rogers was not -- the systems were not built to withstand the cyber environment that we're in now. so, what keeps me up at night can we get through all of our systems and make sure they do have hardening. going forward we're making sure there are key performance parameters in every system we have but we have to go through
the risk mitigation on every one of our systems and saying what is the critical cyb cyber vulnerability. have we taken care of it and i would like to echo it's the manipulation of data since we rely upon our networks that really keeps me up at night. >> the time has expired and the chairman recognizes chairman whitman for five minutes. >> secretary work, i want to begin with getting your perspective on how we address the cyber threat. we have constructed a military of addressing kinetic threats and that is top-to-bottom capability. we have general lists. we have special lists. enlistees come in they learn the lessons in training about what to do in the kinetic environment. we have officers that learn tactics and strategy within that environment. but it seems we have a piecemeal element with the cyber threat. give me your perspective. shouldn't we have the same top-to-bottom capability and
capacity for cyber. shouldn't our enlisted men and women come in and get training in the cyber realm. shouldn't our curriculums include very robust and extensive instruction and education within the cyb cyber realm? how do we construct a force capability kinetically as it should be in the cyber realm? and we're far behind and need to be catching up. give me your perspective on how we should do that, is it valuable to do, and what are you doing to get to that particular point? >> congressman it's very valuable. the first thing is to include what we call this is improving the cyber hygiene of the entire force. making every single member, active duty, civilians, contractors, and reserves, to understand the cyber threat that we face each day and to understand the simple actions they can take to improve our security. i think many of the things that you say in all of our education in our schools, cyber is now an important part of our
curriculum. we have red teams that are going out and helping commanders understand where their vulnerabilities are and how they can improve. we have different types of means by which we hold people accountable for if you have a negligent discharge with a weapon, that is a bad thing. we want everybody to know that a negligent discharge in cyber is almost -- i mean, could be as dangerous. so, i totally agree with what you're saying and this is a big, big cyber -- a cybercultural shift. >> that's the approach we're taking. this is foundational a future for us as a department in terms of executing our missions that the nation is counting on we've got to do it foundationally across the spectrum. we don't need the same level of training that the cyber mission force has but there has to be a basic level of cyber awareness across ranks. this is one environment in which you've given us access to a
keyboard you represent a potential threat of vulnerability and everybody in our department that numbers in the millions, active, civilian, rei rei reservis reservists, guard, everyone is an operator. >> the priority has to be reflected in how resources are dedicated. give me your perspective where are we dedicating resources for milcon, within personnel and training and hardware and software. i think it's also reflected in not only what you're doing from a doctrine standpoint, a philosophy standpoint and training standpoint, but where are you dedicating resources to make sure that you are successfully meeting that objective? >> well, when secretary carter was the deputy secretary filling the job that i fill now, starting around fy-'13 i believe there was a concerted of the to try to increase the investment in cyber forces. i believe that we're doing very
well in this regard. we could always do more. it's budget dependent. but as i said earlier in the -- in testimony secretary carter says wherever our budget ends up, cyber is going to be a very top priority. the one area where i think we could do better on is in tools. we had to build the human capital first. which we have been doing very well. but if there's one area where i think we could do better for admiral rogers and the team is to invest more money in tools that he would be able to then create better options for the force. >> and i would echo. i think we're doing a very good job with the dedicated cyber mission force in terms of the commitment to bring it online. where i think we're going to need to look at over time august the secretary said the things i've raised are tools, situational awareness and the unified platform and then asking ourselves over time is the manpower piece right, is the command and control structure that we put in place right and this is part of an ongoing
process. what i try to remind people, look, cyber is an environment where we are today is not where we'll wind up and we have to stop focusing on the 100% solution up front and take it in bite-size chunks and keep moving out. >> if you could just for the record i'd love to see a breakdown about what you're proposing in resource allocation now, what your projection is in the future to make sure we're building that capability. you talked about the time element. time in this i think is critical, so getting your perspective on how you're going to accomplish that both strategically within the planning sense but also in allocation of resources is going to be critical. >> i'll take that for the record, sir. >> the chair recognizes mr. ashford for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and many of my questions have been asked and answered, but i want to pick up on something that admiral rogers and mr. work mentioned a few minutes ago about the government shutdown know and i've been sitting here since february and i admire everybody on this committee and the witnesses. and i've learned a great deal. i've been here eight months or
whatever. i'm from nebraska. it is absolutely unfathomable, it is beyond belief, it is incomprehensible, that this government, this congress or anybody, would even begin to talk about shutting down the government. for whatever political gain they may get. and, you know, we were in the middle east in february. and at the beginning of the -- not the beginning of the isis effort, but certainly it was -- it was the beginning -- in the beginning stages of our effort to combat isis. and we were in baghdad. and there was discussion at that point about standing up a force to address the social media issues. it was at the very, very beginning, beginnings of that, at least in baghdad, of getting both civilian and military personnel up to speed on what was going on with isis and social media.
and we're now in october. and i know this is a little bit of a speech, and i apologize. but it seems to me at that time, i came back with the sense of all the things we talk about in congress now and all the discussion about shutting down the government and all these other issues. i understand this is democracy. we can talk about what we want to talk about. but i kept thinking to myself, why don't we debate and discuss and at least give to the military, every branch of the military, some clear plan and understanding of where we want to go with not only isis but in the middle east generally. it seems to me that we are reacting to these various incidents. we're reacting with what the russians did today because for whatever these existential threats are there, these other threats are there. it seems to me it's incumbent upon us in congress to clearly indicate to you what we want you to do and where we want you to go. because i think that is totally lacking.
and this week with all the things that went on with the -- in the house, i just kept thinking to myself, what do our military think about -- we can't get our house in order. we can't -- we can't operate. and going back to my service in nebraska, they look at me like we're nuts, you know, we're sending our military, we're asking them to do almost an impossible task around the globe, and we're bickering about stuff that has nothing to do with giving you the capabilities you need to go forward. so, anyway, i've said enough. okay, here's my -- here's my, picking up on your third point about the social media issue, the third thing that keeps you up at night. what's your analysis of where we are in the next minute and 56 seconds, where we are address miller rogers, where we are with that third element and how you see that evolving? >> i think we need to do a better job of contesting isil in
the information dynamic. their ability in the information arena is every bit as important in many ways as their battlefield successes and we've clearly focused a large piece of our strategy on trying to stop and forestall that battlefield activity level. i think we're going to do the same thing in the information dynamic because part of their ability to get out their story, propaganda and vision of the world around us, we need to contest that. it's an idea in many ways as it is a physical presence simplistically on the ground. >> how is that going? >> clearly not where we want it to be. multiple components across the government ongoing, don't get me wrong. but i think it's fair to say we have not achieved yet the impact that we think we need to have and certainly the impact that we want to have. >> congressman, if i could just say that what your opening statement certainly resonates with secretary carter and me. strategy's all about balancing
ways and means and when you have no idea what your means are, it's almost impossible to have a good strategy. as i said earlier today, you know, in the last six years we're in a situation where we think a continuing resolution is a better deal than a government shutdown, and it is. but certainly not something that i as a coo would say i want to operate under. the last six years essentially what we have is a nine-month fiscal year because every first quarter we're in a cr. and that means that we are limited to do what you told us to do last year rather than doing what the things we need to do this year. >> yeah. >> it is an incredible situation. and there is no member of congress in any house, in any party, that would sit in my job as a coo and say, we can make this work without compromising our national security. so, i'm sorry, i'm on the soapbox but this is something that we deal with every day. we hope that we won't have a government shutdown. we hope that the cr will be taken care of in a very soon -- very quick manner. >> my time's up, but thank you
very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank the gentleman. chair now recognizes mr. mcsally for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman and gent. now that you're on the topic i want to make sure i'm on the record after serving 26 years in uniform and seeinging government shutdowns and continuing resolutions and the impact that has on our ability to do our mission i've been strongly advocating against shutting down the government and strongly advocating for us doing our job and actually passing appropriation bills so you can plan and strategize and execute the mission. and i would urge all of my colleagues if you want to each the government open, you need to vote to keep the government open. and that would be my urge to them today. those of us who understand what that means are going to do that but we'd appreciate a large number of my colleagues showing some courage and joining us. anyway on to the issues at hand. prior to running for congress i was a professor at the george c. marshall center. one of our defense security centers. and one of the last courses that i participated in was a senior executive seminar related to
cyber security, cyber terrorism and so in your strategy you talk about building and maintaining robust alliances and partnerships and obviously this is a global domain, so they're now starting -- one of my colleagues phil lark retired marine colonel is starting a program on cyber security studies or he's leading that and effort so i'm wondering if you could speak to how the defense security centers fit in with this strategy. how you feel as far as resources in order to use tools like these security centers like the marshall center to execute that strategy, and whether you need new authorities or additional resources in that venue. >> well, first of all, these different centers are very vital. part of our strategy regardless of what the level of resources are, congresswoman, is partnerships. >> yep. >> and establishing strong partnerships. as admiral rogers and terry have said, this is a collaborative environment we all fales the
same threats and need to operate together. >> right. >> i don't know if there are any authorities that mike would ask to help us work more deeply with our partners, but i know that we are doing so and very aggressively. >> resources as well, yeah. >> it hasn't been an authorities issue as much in the case specifically of the marshall center and general breedlove has asked both i and the department for assistance. i think it will generate good outcomes in europe as we're trying to understand the broader cyber environment. i've said i will be there to provide expertise to help because that's what i can bring, not necessarily money. i don't think either of you off the top of our head knows the specifics other than the fact that we've committed to moving forward on it. >> i will tell you having been there and sometimes we have senior officials from 45 different countries, this is not -- it's not a technical course. it's more of an awareness of best practices, policy issues, especially for some of our less capable partners.
they're not ever going to have a cyber command like we do, but if we can raise their game up a bit and have better collaboration and coordination for strategic understanding, best practices, how to quickly alert and respond and working with each other intelwise and threatwise, i think it goes a long ways. i was very impressed with the capabilities that we have there and i would think it's a little bit of an investment for potentially huge strategic outcomes. >> we agree with you completely. >> when you say some of that work is related, michael is reviewing things but over the next months we'll be in nato working to do exactly that raising their cyber basics. >> right. >> we'll be in bulgaria doing the same thing and some of that is a result of some of the arrangements that were worked from the marshall center. >> great. >> that is paying back some good dividends. >> excellent. i look forward to working with you in the future if you have any other additional requests related to that with the first hand experience i have, not just the marshall center but the other defense centers. thank you, gentlemen. i appreciate it.
mr. chairman, i yield back. >> i recognize mr. duckworth for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, i'm very interested in looking at cyb cyber vulnerabilities and our critical infrastructure. i'd love to drill down more specifically to our bases and installations that support core war fighting functions. i feel they face similar threats. our installations are tied into local grids. rely on sewage and water from the surrounding areas. so, there's always potential for impact for those basic life services on the base. certainly continuity of operations is critical for dod just as it is for our civilian infrastructure. admiral, i'd like for you to sort of address this and i'll give you an example that i found deeply, deeply disturbing. i took a tour of a contractor that -- a wonderful company that works in smart grid technology. and as part of this tour of this facility, small business, they
were very proud to show me what they were doing that one of our contractors at one of our bases, actually the base for a major -- i won't say what this base is because this is not a secret room, but it was a major -- it was the home for a major maneuver division in the army. and from another state where i was i watched them turn off the lights. at that base. and then when i asked the person was operating the computer who was turning on and off the -- the lights on and off at this base, i said do you have a secret clearance? he said no. do you as a company have anybody with a secret clearance? yes, the chief engineer does, but this was an unsecure room. people in the business were coming in and out and they were very -- amazing technology that's going to help us save tons of money when it comes to environmental costs and energy efficiency and all those good things as a democrat i love. but i was deeply, deeply concerned that i was sitting there watching them turn the lights on and off on a major road on a major installation of
a major maneuver division command in the army. admiral, if you could speak a little bit to perhaps what you're doing to both coordinate with installations command for each of the different branches whether it is the army's installation management command, the marine corps' installation command and also local civilian infrastructures as well. and by the way, this base is outside of a major metropolitan city. it's not one of the army bases that's out in the middle of nowhere. i spent a lot of time at those myself. but i was deeply concerned. >> so, we share your concern. the services and installation and their respective installation commands are working with each individual installation. i have been an installation commander myself in the course of my career so i have experience, as a commander, when you're so dependent in some ways on infrastructure and capability that is outside your immediate span and control and yet it directly drives your ability to execute your mission, it's one of the reasons why collectively in the department we ask ourselves what are the capabilities we need to bring on the installation if you will to put redundancy and backups in so
we have a level of control. we're working our way through this. the challenge i think we find s is, again, it goes just the scope of the problem sets out there. it's just the infrastructure that we count on as a department that just the broad swath of it, the size and the age of it in many ways as we're trying to collectively work our way through this. this is a problem set that's going to take years to work our way through. i don't think there's any doubt about that. >> do you have a liaison from cyber command that sits at installation command for each of the branches of service? >> no. what i do is i work through my service components who partner with their installation commands. in the last job where i was the navy's cyber individual reporting to u.s. cyber command i was working directly with the navy's navel command. and then we still do that now. >> is there any policy that looks at -- and one of the great things about this committee is this is a very bipartisan committee and i want to applaud
the continuing work on acquisition reform. but one of my concerns with acquisition reform is these contractors and sub-subcontractors, north american regional headquarters is actually in my district. >> right. >> i have concern that we are talking about service subcontractors that are several layers down and we're not inspecting them. there's nobody inspecting this contractor and making sure that they were -- i mean, that they had, you know, secured their facilities and their computers and that -- [ inaudible ] turning on and off the lights at a major military base. >> right. so, we've taken this specifically for action and we'll feedback on that. i share your concern, ma'am, this is something we're going to have to just work our way through. >> what are you specifically -- do you have plans in place? are you writing policy? what are you doing specifically to address this particular issue? >> i apologize -- >> mike, let me take that one. >> yeah. >> there is policy in place. we are looking at all of the installations and frankly grading them and looking for where are the priorities.
as mike said, this is a priority issue. there's a vast number of, you know, installations, very frankly the control systems for power and water when they were belt, there was no consideration of cyber. so, now we have to go back and fix that. we have a list of those priorities. we are prioritizing on those bases that -- that have more strategic assets first, which i think is smart, and we will keep going down that list to fix those issues. but there is a priority list. we have new language required in the f.a.r. for all levels of contractors to meet certain requirements about the security control systems and that is in place. >> can i have a couple of your priorities list and the new language for contractors? is that available for members of congress? >> we will certainly take that up for the record and i'm sure it is and we'll figure out how to get it for you. >> thank you. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> chair now recognizes gentleman from arizona, mr. franks, nor five minutes. >> well, thank you, mr. chairman. admiral rogers, i appreciate
people like you that put yourself at risk and assiduously try to do everything you can to protect the homeland and the future generations, so on behalf of my children, thank you. i'm going to paraphrase here but in recent press briefings at the wilson center you said that what keeps you up at night -- i know you've been asked that question several times today -- are threats to critical infrastructure and that you've been observing nation-states spending a lot of time within the power structure of the united states. and as you know better than perhaps anyone the department of defense relies upon the electric grid for 99% of its electricity needs without which even the department's position is that it cannot affect its mission. and, of course, there are 320 million americans that also depend upon pretty significantly for everyday survival. and a widespread collapse of the electric grid, of course, would lead to gross societal collapse.
so, under your cyber -- wearing your cybercom hat, how protected is our electric grid from, number one, cyber attacks and lesser-discussed attacks that could come from geomagnetic disturbance or electromagnetic pulse and do you find industry to be a willing partner in helping to secure the grid, what have you been tasked with or coordinated with or asked to do from the department of homeland security or frc or the ferc in regards to hardening the electric grid and protecting it and just giving us your best military advice? a lot of questions here, i'm sorry, what you think needs to be accomplished to robustly harden our electric grid against these stated threats. >> let me try to do them backwards to forwards. remember, dod does not physically act on private sector
networks. i'm not responsible for hardening -- >> that's true, but without them you'll certainly maybe revisit that. >> my only point is your question specifically, though, is so what are you doing as, well, that's not cyber command's role. what we do is partner with dhs in their role. i try to make sure that, again, because of one of the missions you heard the secretary talk about in the very beginning, where there was an expectation that dod needs to be ready to respond if the president decides that we have to respond to a cyber event of significant consequence, a power scenario is definitely one of the things we talk about. so we partner with dhs. we partner with the segment, for example, we do a cyber guard annual exercise. i had two different power sector segments from two different parts of the united states that participated in this exercise. it was one of the scenarios we walked our way through. in terms of the grid, if you will, vulnerability, i would argue it's pretty broad. if you look on the eastern part of the united states the grid's operating on the margins already just between capacity and demand.
the other point i try to make particularly in the eastern part of the united states is we need to think more than just the u.s. our grid in the east in particular is so tied into our canadian counterparts for hydroelectric is flowing south to meet our basic needs. the other challenge i find in the power sector is -- and they're quick to remind me of this -- is their business model. we're a regulated industry. the only way for us to generate revenue is through rates. those are governed. i just can't universally say i'm going to up charges to generate a $5 billion capital fund that i can use to invest in basic infrastructure. so, each of the utilities, if you will, within the sector is trying to work their way through it. >> well, i appreciate that. i guess one of the things over the years in dealing with this issue that has occurred to me is that what you just said -- and you're absolutely correct. you know this is not your responsibility to tell the private sector what to do with
the grid. but then the private sector, when we talk to them about hardening the grid for national security purposes, they say that's the national defense apparatus' job and in the meantime this what could be a profound threat given the fact that all of our other security apparatus -- or our other critical infrastructures rely heavily upon the grid, it walks the 13th floor of congressional debate and no one addresses it. and, of course, you know, there's always a moment in the life of every problem when it is big enough tî3vp be seen and st small enough to be addressed and i think we live in that window so i certainly don't offer you any advice. just the question i hope lingers in our minds is are we doing what is relevant to protect the national security on this particular threat. because certainly the loss of the grid would be the ultimate cyber security issue. i mean, if you can't turn those computers on you can't do really much else. again, there's no arrogance in my comments, admiral. i think that you're doing a great job and i hope you will consider this as much as
possible. thank you. >> thank the gentleman for yielding back. all of our members have completed their questions. i want to thank the witnesses for their time and preparation for this hearing. i know it takes a lot to get ready for these and your time here today but it's been very beneficial for us, and with that, we are adjourned. coming up tonight here on c-span3 it's american history tv in prime time. starting at 8:00 eastern it's a visit to the national gallery of art to tour early american portraits by artists such as john singleton copley and gilbert stuart. that will be followed by a look at medical history with a visit to the national museum of health and medicine. following that at 9:30 how the white house works. both as an office building and a home with a trip to the white house visitors center and at
10:00 p.m. we'll learn about the lives of early american migrants from europe and what rural life was like with a visit to the frontier culture museum all tonight starting at 8:00 eastern here on c-span3. and on c-span former undersecretary of defense michele flournoy is at a conference of foreign policy hosted by the bush school at texas a&m university. here's a preview -- >> you know, when i first -- my first tour in the pentagon back in the '90s in the clinton administration,murgx i decided i was kind of a lonely thing being, you know, a woman leader at that time, so i said let's have a lunch for all of the women -- seniorwomen leaders in the point gone and we fit at one table. it was either eight or ten. and for weeks afterwards there was, like, the conspiracy
theories the women got together and had lunch. what were they plotting. what was going on. now, you know, at least, you know, when i was in the pentagon in 2012 i would say if you invited all the women leaders in the pentagon, you'd actually overflow the executive dining room, so that's good. >> that's great. >> but at the very highest levels it's still -- i was still often the only woman in the room for many, many meetings. i think it's improving in our agency, but still women are definitely the minority. and so i think, you know, progress since the 1990s, definitely better now than it was. but more progress to be made. >> a ways to go. >> and you can see all of this event tonight. it starts at 9:30 eastern on our companion network c-span. known as the city of good neighborhoods, this weekend our c-span cities tour joined by
time warner cable explores the history and literary life of buffalo, new york, on book tv we'll visit the mark twain room at the buffalo and erie county public library, whose centerpiece are pages of the original handwritten manuscript of "adventures of huckleberry finn." then we'll feature tim bowen's book "against the grain." >> the irish settled in this neighborhood because they were desperate, came over across the atlantic during the famine and the years after the famine things still weren't great. it would take maybe one relative to find out about these plentiful jobs along the waterfront, working in the grain elevators or in the mills. and then word would go back to ireland you want to come to buffalo. youn't aren't going to become but you will have steady employment. they came to this neighborhood called the first ward. it has its name because when buffalo first was created in 1832 as a city, it was divided into five political wards, and
this area along the waterfront, along the buffalo river, has always been the first ward. >> on american history tv, on september 6th, 1901, president william mckinley was assassinated in buffalo. we'll tour the buffalo history museum exploring the mckinley exhibit. that features events surrounding his death and the gun used to shoot the president. then discover the history of the buffalo water front and how its adapted from the nation's grain center to modern redevelopment. >> right now we're at silo city. this is a collection of grain elevators built along a bend in the buffalo river. originally built for different companies, but today all owned by rick smith who is the owner of ridge high metals over on ohio street and it's now besides being regenerated for many different purposes, for arts, for music, we do history tours where we take people around the grain elevators and tell the story of buffalo buffalo's hist sorts of different uses for these historic silos.
>> see all of our programs from buffalo saturday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on c-span 2's book tv and sunday afternoon at 2:00 on american history tv on c-span3. the c-span cities tour, working with our cable affiliates and visiting cities across the country. every five years the departments of agriculture and health and human services issue dietary guidelines and nutritional information to the public. the latest of which are expected to be released in december. the house agriculture committee looked at these guidelines attended by tom vilsack and sylvia burrwell. the hearing was chaired by congressman michael conway of texas. >> well, good morning.
let's go ahead and get started. mr. keller, would you open us with a prayer, please. >> dear heavenly father, we just ask that you bless this committee. we ask that you bless this government. we ask that you bless all those who lead this great nation. dear lord, we just ask that everything we do honor and please you in jesus' name i pray, amen. >> thank you. this committee of agriculture regarding the developments of the 2015 dietary guidelines for americans will come to order and i want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning. it is no small feat to get two of the secretaries of two of the most important agencies in government to come sit at the same table at the same time so i thank you, secretary vilsack and burrwell, for making it ham, we appreciate it. we're going to discuss the development of the 2015 dietary guidelines for americans.
it's not our intent to legislate specific guidelines, however, we ask that the guidelines be developed in a transparent manner. it's a recommendation to the american people on how to make healthy food purchasing decisions to live a healthy lifestyle but it also forms a basis of federal nutrition policy, education, outreach efforts used by consumers and educators and health care profession professionals. it's essential the guidance can be trusted by the american people. to achieve this it must be based on sound and consistent and irrefutable science. it is congressionally man dated and according to the act the dga shall contain nutrition and dietary guidelines for the general public and be based on the scientific and medical knowledge current at the time the report is prepared and shall be promoted by each federal agency. and ensuring a sound development process is important because it is extremely difficult to reverse or change public policy once implemented without causing
consumer confusion at a time when consumers[h are already subjected to conflicting and often contradictory nutrition and health information staying within the scope of the law by providing the public with science-based realistic and achievable information is more likely to contribute to public health outcomes. the process began in 2012 when there was created and appointed the 15 members to the dietary guidelines advisory committee. through this committee, all advisory committees must be chartered by the federal advisory act which means the guidelines must be subjective to the public for establishing and overseeing and terminating the committees. this makes the committee solely responsible to the usda and the hhs who are then responsible for continually reviewing the committee's performance and process requirements which
includes activities as detailed as approving all of the meeting agendas. it is therefore the responsibility of usda and hhs to maintain the scope and level of the dga. and i've weighed in our concerns about the process of develop toing tto i developing the guidelines. you received over 29,000 public comments to the committee's report. many of which were developed by nutritionists and other experts in the study of human health. included in the submitted comments available for public viewing on the dga website were scientific studies and other evidence that observers assert had been ignored by the committee. as a result i repeatedly requested that each and every comment be considered before the final guidelines are published. in may the ranking member and i saw in writing details on your plan to review the more than 29,000 comments. to make sure that the -- they
were reviewed properly. your response to us on that plan, though, was less than sufficient so i look forward to hearing today on this matter. uncertainty in the process leads to concern about whether the committee's recommendations will maintain the scientific integrity necessary to be actionable by americans. it's my hope that the usda and hhs review of the 2015 recommendations that they are mindful -- in that review they are mindful of the process failures that lie squarely between each of the recommendations. it is imperative to hear assurances from each of you that americans will be ultimately presented with the best and most reliable information for making healthy food and beverage choices. again, thank you secretaries for being with us today and i look forward to our conversation. comments from the ranking member? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i welcome both secretary burrwell and secretary vilsack to the committee and look forward to your testimony. given that usda and hhs are still reviewing comments, we're probably getting ahead of ourselves here. but i do hope that today's
testimony can shed more light on the process to establish new guidelines and what they will actually mean for our constituents. there's been a strong reaction to the dietary guidelines advisory committee report. i've heard concerns about future sodium targets, difficulties of small schools meeting the guidelines and what this could mean for cranberries and sugar. but these are mostly coming from those who are directly impacted, the industries, schools, medical community. we're not really hearing from the public. and i don't think the general public is paying much attention. for those who are, i think they are very skeptical of the whole process. for example, we were once told that butter and eggs were bad for you. now i guess they're okay according to "the washington post" this morning they were wrong on milk as well. and i don't know how much government subsidized powder we bought because of it.
so, people i think may be losing confidence in these guidelines. given the public skepticism maybe we should reconsider why we're doing this. is it because it's something that we've always done? maybe we should first look to expand on a provision of the 2008 farm bill that would help us understand more about what people are actually eating and then go from there. i am a little concerned that we've lost sight of what we're doing and there seems to be more focus on ideology and marketing food products than providing clear nutritioned a ve ed advic public. i hope we can have a good productive public hearing and achieve a good outcome. i know you'll do the best you can breaking through all the noise and i thank the secretaries for appearing before us and i yield back. >> thank the gentleman. mrs. burrwell has a hard stop at 11:30 because she's got an
international flight to catch. with that, i don't know which one of you wants to go first. >> i'd be happy to, thank you, good morning. thank you, mr. chairman and ranking member peterman and the rest of the committee to discuss the dietary guidelines. i want to thank you for the interest in the guidelines and your work to support americans and a healthy agriculture sector. one of the most important responsibilities that our government is entrusted with is protecting the american public and that includes empowering them with the tools they need to make educated health decisions. families across america have looked to us for science-based dietary guidelines to serve as a framework for a nutritious eating and healthy lives. our guidelines also help lay a foundation for preventing diet related health conditions such as obesity and heart disease. as is required by the national nutrition monitoring and related
research act the departments update these regulations and guidelines every five years. the key elements that make up a healthy lifestyle remain consistent. fruits and vegetables, grains and lean proteins and limited amounts of saturated fats, added sugars and sodium. we anticipate these will continue to be the building blocks of the 2015 guidelines. updated to reflect the latest research and science as well as our current understanding of the connections between food and health. as part of our effort to rely on the best science available, we have appointed an independent advisory committee of nutrition and medical experts and practitioners to inform each addition. the 2015 advisory committee evaluated research and considered comments from the public to develop recommendations included in its finished report. it is important to note that the advisory committee report is one input into the dietary guidelines. the guidelines themselves are written and reviewed by experts
at both of our departments. in addition to the recommendations of the advisory committee, our departments' experts perform their own extensive review and consideration of public comments. in fact, as was mentioned, we received 29,000 written comments during the 75-day public comment period. as a result, the 2015 dietary guidelines will be informed by review of thousands of scientific papers and decades of nutrition and medical research as well as input from the public. we know that the guidelines are critical importance to many americans. they contribute to a culture of wellness and empower individuals to better manage their own health. help keep their families healthy, reduce the onset of disease and reduce the amount of money that we spend on health care. they also provide guidance to public and private programs and support efforts to help our nation reach its highest standard of health. at hhs the dietary guidelines
provide a roadmap for the nutrition, advice and services that we deliver such as chronic disease prevention efforts, food assistance programs and educational initiatives. hhs and usda are working together to finalize the 2015 dietary guidelines which are expected to be completed in democrats december of this year. without a finished product i'm unable to comment on the final comment of the forthcoming edition at this time. i expect, however, that the new guidelines will continue to emfa size the importance of healthy eating habits and individual food choices. i want to thank you again for your interest in this topic as well as the feedback we've received. i know many of you have specific questions and concerns, and i want to assure you that we are taking your concerns into consideration, and we're working hard to anxioswer your questions thoroughly as we can. i look forward to continuing to work together and look forward to your questions today. thank you.
>> thank you, secretary. secretary vilsack? >> thank you, mr. chairman and ranking mek pe ining member pet the members of the committee. i want to thank the chair for the opportunity to be here today and i want to thank my colleague for the extraordinary work that she and her team have done in concert with the department of agriculture and getting us to this point today. i will tell you that i struggle with the dietary guidelines because i think it's important for people to understand precisely what they are and what they are not. these guidelines are a set of recommendations. based on a series of well-informed opinions that create a framework that is designed to encourage and to educate americans about what they can do to increase their chances of preventing chronic diseases. this is not about treating disease. this is about trying to prevent chronic diseases. as a result, the guidelines that we formulate are and should be
restricted by law to nutritional and dietary information. the advisory committee report which secretary burrwell mentioned is not the guidelines and sometimes there's confusion about that. the report informs our work, but certainly does not and should not dictate it. only hhs and usda can and should write the guidelines based on a variety of inputs. this has been an open and transparent process. questions were posed by and to the advisory committee. a number of studies, indeed thousands of studies and tens of thousands of pages of documents were reviewed. those reviews went through a very strict and gold standard process for determining what is the strongest, best and most available science. multiple public meetings took place. information was posted on the web. and we indeed received 29,000
comments as a result of the extended comment period of which 8,000 comments are probably considered unique. recognize that our process here is to determine the best available science and based on that and the preponderance of that we formulate the guidelines. i believe i have the same goal that secretary burrwell has, had is to finish our work on time before the end of the year so that we can use these guidelines as directed by congress. so, i look forward to your comments and questions. and i think this hearing is an important opportunity for us to educate folks about what these guidelines are and what they are not. >> well, thank you. i got ahead of myself. let me mention the chairman requested other members to submit their opening statements for the record and i've rudely failed to introduce secretary tom vilsack who is the secretary of the department of agriculture and the honorary secretary sylvia burrwell. two folks who didn't need an
introduction and i didn't introduce you, so i apologize for that. the chair would remind members that they will be recognized for questioning in order of seniority. after that members will be recognized in order of arrival and i appreciate the members' understanding. i recognize myself for five minutes. ms. burrwell, you said in your comments that the guidelines don't change substantially from one set to the next but yet the reports have gone from 57 pages of the 99 -- the commission reports, 99 -- or 57 pages and 95 to 571 pages for this one. so, i'm not sure we've gotten ten times better information today than we did in that point in time. as i mentioned in my opening statement the oversight we're conducting today is on the development of the guidelines and concern for the integrity of the process and as a result recommendations the federal advisory committee act defines how advisory committees operate.
the law put special emphasis on open meetings and chartering, public involvement, reporting. according to statute the federal advisory committee shall among other things require membership to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions performed and contain appropriate provisions to make sure the advisory committee will not be overly influenced by appointments or special interests but will be independent judgment. despite the statutory safeguards serious questions have been raised about the overall -- oversight overall process while it was ongoing. this tended to fuel concerns that members of the commission may have been appointed in order to achieve certain policy outcomes outside the legitimate purview of the advisory committee. i refer specifically to an op-ed published in 2015 by former deputy secretary kathleen merger who serves at george washington university. she was serving as deputy
secretary during the time that dgac was chartered and appointed. it's been on topic of intense discussion for some time. i recognize that you both jointly published a blog yesterday acknowledging the sustainability is out of the scope of this exercise and identify hoi hope to get commen about tax issues as well. i likewise -- i'm likewise sure that you recognize the inclusion of these issues in this process could have resulted in ill-advised guidelines. the counter to potential bias in the process is the public comment period. 75-day period was the public's first real opportunity to review the 571-page document. in your written statement, secretary burrwell, you mentioned that usda and hhs staff have already fully reviewed all the comments. you said that you focused most heavily on those with scientific justification. help us understand, then, what's going on right now. what have you done with the
studies such as those evaluating low carbohydrate consumption patterns since the review has been taking place? >> i think there were a number of issues raised. and i apologize i could not hear your final question. >> what have you been doing -- we've got the study in. then you've been studying the comments and the report itself. can you talk to us about how you've been evaluating other information like low carbohydrate consumption patterns as a part of that review? >> so, with regard to one issue that you touched on earlier that i want to go ahead and address, i think you asked which was the tax issue and the question of tax policy. like our comments yesterday in the blog that secretary vilsack and i put out about the issue of sustainability, i think while we are not -- because we are not -- we haven't received recommendations from our staff speaking to the specifics of what are in the dietary guidelines, i think that's a question of scope like the sustainability question and that is not an issue that we would address. so on the tax issue when i
address that. with regard to the process that we are now going through and how whether it's the carbohydrate issue or any of the specific issues, what is happening is we receive the guidelines. we receive the report of the committee. our staffs are reviewing that. at the same time we are reviewing all of the public comments that we have received. and in addition to that we are bringing in the experts from all of our departments to make sure that they weigh in as we do the consideration. and for us that includes the food and drug administration, the nih, the center for disease control, the office of the assistant secretary for health and any others. so that's the process that we are using now to review -- >>-- could have things in them that weren't necessarily directly reported in the recommendations from the commission -- from the commit at this? you could have outside your own wisdom, your own thoughts would be reflected in the guidelines as well? >> in terms of the expert advice of our staffs that exist with regard to the question of
studies and pieces of work, i think it is important to reflect what secretary vilsack said, which is, there has been a systemic literature review with regard to the studies and that's part of keeping integrity to the process. with regard to our experts who are constantly involved in those issues, yes, they will be a part of that process. >> thank you, ranking member? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think you both know that sodium not only provides a benefit in making product shelves -- making products shelf stable, it also improves taste and is an important food safety component in cheese. studies have shown there's an inconsistent and insufficient evidence to conclude that lowering sodium intake below 2,300 milligrams per day reduces risk of cardiovascular disease and the dietary guidelines advisory committee agreed. so, why has the committee continued to support further sodium reduction and is this something that you'll be able to address in your guidelines?
>> let me take a stab at that. you know, first of all, i think it's -- again, i think we're going to probably respond to a number of these questions by pointing out these guidelines have not been formulated yet and we can't comment on the specifics of what the guidelines will be because we haven't had an opportunity to prepare them and review them. having said that, in the advisory committee basically is formulated, they go through a process, as secretary burrwell indicated, of reviewing a variety of studies. there no doubt were2bc8ñ studiet linked prehypertension, hypertension to sodium consumption. they probably looked at the national academy of medicine studies in terms of sodium and they probably connell clucluded there was evidence relating to sodium consumption and these chronic diseases, which is why they have recommended what they've recommended. the reality of this situation is that -- that -- that science
changes. and we learn more information. and that's why it's important to have a process that we have in place to review what the advisory committee recommends, then to have public input to get public comments, to have our own staff review studies based on information that they've accumulated during the course of the five-year period since the last dietary guidelines and also to refer back to the last set of guidelines, which is a foundation for this set of guidelines. so, congressman, you know, i can't comment specifically on why the advisory committee did what they did, because they sort of operate independent. we don't inject ourselves into that process. but we do basically take their input into consideration along with many, many other studies, many, many other popinions to ty to formulate the best set of guidelines and framework for the country. >> thank you, mr. secretary. i don't know if -- have you both have seen "the washington post"
story today? secretary sill vvilsack, i gues you've seen it. >> i've seen it. i've read the several people that were mentioned in there, i've read books by those folks in preparation for this. this is what has caused my concern about what these guidelines are and what they are not. >> my concern is, you know, we've had these guidelines that have pushed people away from eggs and butter and milk and so forth, and then they come back and say, well, we were wrong, you know? and so my question is, for both of you, what are we going to do to make sure that doesn't happen in the future? first of all, i guess do you agree with this? and second of all, how are we going to keep this from happening? why are we going off on these tan ge tan gents if we have a process that's so heavily vetted? >> i would say a couple of things. i think first the consistency over time for most issues has been there. and it's right to point out that with regard to the issue
specifically of dietary cholesterol, there has been a change over time. i think a couple things to answer your question. first, for the most part, things are consistent over time. second, we need to make sure we use the most scientific evidence we can. and there has been an evolution and change and it gets reflected in what the advisory committee gives us. they no longer will do recommendations based on expert opinion. instead they will only do recommendations based on the science and that is a change that will occur. i think the other thing that is an important thing to reis that in some cases science does change. and in the case of our understanding of blood cholesterol versus dietary cholesterol, there has been an evolution and understanding in the difference of those and what they cause. and i think we want to be prepared to make sure we review in a rigorous way times that happened. i think there's not one simple answer to the problem that you rai raise, but a number of pieces how we can work to get to a
place where we have the most consistent, science-based a vice. >> and let me simply add that congress has directed us to look at the preponderance of available science, which i would suggest, a term that i'm familiar with in the practice of law, there may be studies on both sides of the issue and it is important and necessary for folks to sort of weigh the studies. and one of the challenges of this is to distinguish between one single quality study that is absolutely solid versus a bulk of studies over time that may have a slightly different view. and this is the challenge here. and it's a reflection of the fact that all of this is evolving. you're not going to ever have something that just basically is going to be a fact about this, because science evolves. we learn more. we understand more. and i would hope that we would be flexible enough to appreciate that and to take that into consideration. >> well, i thank both of you for your observations and i think you made some points. but i just want you to understand from my constituents,
most of them don't believe the stuff anymore. you have lost your credibility with a lot of people. and they are just flat-out ignoring this stuff, and so that's why i say i wonder why we're doing this from what i'm hearing from my constituents -- >> can i respond to that for just a second? here's the challenge, though, we take these guidelines, we incorporate them in our website "use my plate." we've had over 290 million hits on "choose my plate." it may very well be that there are folks who are concerned about this. but i still think there's merit in it as long as people understand what they are and what they're not. they are not a -- you know, a hard, fast set of rules. they are a guideline. a set of guidelines. a framework. and they're not about treating disease. they're about preventing it. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to go back to something that the chairman was asking and i want to make sure that we are
all on the same page here. so, taxes are off the table as far as consideration in the guidelines, is that correct? >> with regard to the recommendation in our dietary guidelines, we do not believe that is something that is in scope of the work that we are doing. >> secretary vilsack? >> well, that's not within the scope. it's not dietary. it's not nutrition. it doesn't belong in this context. there are many other ways that conversation should be taken as is the case with sustainability. it doesn't belong here. it belongs elsewhere. i'm happy to have that conversation. >> sustainability, both of you agree then, sustainability and taxes are off the table as far as these recommendations are concerned? >> both important issues that we believe should have conversations but not in the context of this document. >> thank you. hhs and usda have always stated that they have looked to appoint
members to the dgac so it consists of nationally recognized experts in the fields of nutrition and health. as you know the dgac is subject to the federal advisory committee act used throughout the federal government. this act is designed to ensure that the advice of various advisory committees formed over the years is objective and accessible to the public. the act was formalized a process of establishing an opening on operating and terminating these bodies from 2015 once selected and appointed the dgac was composed of academics including professors, epidemiologists and even a physician scientist. from prior guidelines, nutritionists and food scientists were not selected to serve on this dgac. understandably questions are
being raised by the fact no food industry scientists were included in the dgac committee. after the dgac had disbanded, the former advisory committee members decided to hold a public event acting in their capacity as dgac members which they were not according to the act. is it your responsibility to make recommendations to both of your departments, which is then developed for final recommendations for the public. it is, however, not the responsibility for the dgac to educate the general public on a report that still needed to be considered by the hhs before claiming nutritional recommendations were based on dietary guidelines. secretary burwell, what instructions were given the advisory committee members regarding the advisory
committee's disbandment? >> with regard to the specifics of the disbandment, i can get back to you, congressman, with regard to the direction that was given to review the science with regard to the issues that were in front of them with regard to the dietary guidelines and present a report about that. so with regard to the question of disbandment, i don't know what, if any, specific direction was given, but i think the point that you've made, which is this is about an advisory committee producing a document, an independent group of people producing a document, that then is an element in the basis is what their role is. >> was the role to then go out and start doing a road show on their recommendation? is that a part of the scope of that committee? >> with regard to what followed -- what we followed at the department and what i know about is once we received the
committee's recommendations and those became public that there was a public comment period. that was the part that we have both been focused on and the 29,000 comments that have come in from the public as well as when we heard from you all that you asked for an extension of the public comment. secretary vilsack and i quickly agreed that was something we thought was an important thing to do. that's the part of the process in terms of public input. >> one is -- did they follow the guidelines, and what steps were taken to make sure the committee followed the law and then from an ethical standpoint once you've served as your capacity of that advisory committee and made your recommendations, what is your responsibility in moving forward and one of the things we don't want is these advisories turn this into a profitable situation on their behalf because of their participation on that advisory committee. >> with regard to voluntary, nonpaid, they all have to file financial disclosures on an
this process and so those are all things we want to protect against. with regard to the specific question of a press briefing or some kind of briefing, i apologize, not familiar with that, as i said. we have focused on the public comments and the steps and process that we are following. >> time has expired. mr. scott for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i'm very concerned that you're not using the most relevant, basic, and the best science related information in formulating these guidelines. you certainly did not use some of the most recent peer reviewed and published nutrition and diet related science. it was not even considered by the advisory committee. and not even considered by the advisory committee when they were finalizing the report. that's a fact. and, mr. vilsack, you said you were using the best information.
your quote was we have the best informed opinions, but if you're not using the most recent peer review, that information that is there and your committee has not even agreed to put it into the final report, so maybe you all can give me some level of confidence that your staffs and you will take into consideration the strong scientific evidence with the final policy document even though it was not included in the evidence-based library throughout the working group process. >> congressman, can you be specific about which study you're talking about? >> i'm talking about the scientific study that came out that gave evidence that certain things were very important. example. let's look at the whole issue of the involvement of sugar and how
it's not even included. why, for example, that low calorie sweeteners is not being recommended when the study pointed out that low calorie sweeteners could be used to lower weight, to be able to help with what is called adiposity and is not even being used. what's wrong with low calorie sweeteners that can be used and it's not even in the report? >> congressman, let me try to respond to the question as best i can. first of all, when you have a process that is every five years, you're going to have to have at some point in time a cutoff of what information you consider because theoretically the minute before we published the guidelines somebody could publish a study and you would be criticizing us for not taking
the latest science into consideration. there has to be a cutoff time in terms of consideration. having said that, over 4,000 studies were reviewed, 300 manuscripts reviewed and went through a gold standard for appropriateness and efficiency of the study. i think it is unfair to the committee and unfair to the process to suggest that we're not looking at the science. as far as sugars are concerned, look, here is the problem, our children, 15% to 17% of what they consume is sugar and so obviously we're looking for ways in which we can reduce that and i think what they were recommending if you have sugar in your diet, you ought to at least look for the most nutritionally dense foods that you possibly can consume for that sugar. that you don't use empty calories to obtain it. you could have chocolate milk
versus a low cal drink.gfx you get more bang for your buck out of that process. and that's what they were suggesting. >> but you are familiar with that report, the added sugars working group said that moderate and generally consistent evidence from adults and children supports replacing sugar containing sweeteners with low calorie sweeteners to reduce calorie intake, body weight, and why the dgac, the guidelines for america would then recommend consumers not. you've used this evidence, pointed to where it could be helpful but then the committee
represents that they not use low calorie sweeteners to reduce added sugars. if this report is going to have value for the welfare of the american people and you all say you're using the most recent information then this clearly contradicts that. >> there is one that is in the report and the specifics of that as we said are not something we received recommendations. my understanding of what is in to the question of substitution of the drinks is that not enough evidence exists one way or the other to make a recommendation and that is where the committee left the issue of the substitution.